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We use daily hotel occupancy, price, and revenue data to analyze the economic impact of 
the 2008 and 2012 Democratic and Republican National Conventions. We find that political 
conventions generate approximately 29,000 room nights of lodging, though this figure is offset 
by lower hotel occupancy during the week before and, to a lesser extent, after conventions.  
Conventions increase hotel revenue by approximately $20 million on average, a figure which 
suggests that host cities’ claims of economic impacts of $150 million or more may be 
implausible. 
.  
JEL Classification Codes: O18, R53 
 
Keywords:  conventions, mega-event, tourism, hotel occupan 
 
 
Forthcoming in Papers in Regional Science 
                                                 
†Department of Economics, Berry College, Campus Box 495024, Mount Berry, GA 
30149, (706) 290-2688, lheller@berry.edu 
†† Department of Economics, Berry College, Campus Box 495024, Mount Berry, GA 
30149, (706) 238-7878, efstephenson@berry.edu  
††† Department of Economics, Box 157A, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA 




Sponsors of major events often claim that they bring large economic benefits to the 
communities that host them by causing an influx of travelers. Many economists and regional 
scientists, on the other hand, are more skeptical, suggesting that visitors to mega-events displace 
regular tourists, disrupt normal local economic activity, and are subject to large leakages. This 
paper examines hotel occupancy, room rates, and hotel revenues during the 2008 and 2012 
Democratic and Republican National Conventions for evidence of increased economic activity in 
the host cities.  
The Republican and Democratic National Conventions take place every four years, 
roughly three months before the presidential elections in order to nominate the major parties’ 
candidates for President. They attract a large number of delegates, media representatives, and 
security personnel, and it is claimed that they result in substantial economic benefits for the host 
cities. Table 1 shows recent political conventions along with some claims about their economic 
impact. With numbers routinely in excess of $150 million and occasionally reaching as high as 
$400 million, political conventions would seem to constitute a large windfall to host cities if such 
economic impact claims are correct. The economic impact numbers in Table 1 are typically 
generated by estimating the amount of direct spending done by convention visitors and local 
organizers in conjunction with the event and then applying multiplier effects from pre-packaged 
computer programs to obtain the resulting indirect economic impact from money recirculating in 
the local economy. 
Economists and regional scientists have long been critical of the methodology used in 
these sort of economic impact reports for numerous reasons (Baade and Dye 1988; Matheson 
2008). First, spending on things that would have occurred anyway is often included in economic 
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impact. As a case in point, in Tampa in 2012, over half of the reported $214 million direct 
economic impact was a result of infrastructure improvements made by telecommunications and 
utility companies prior to the event (Danielson 2013). Since for-profit service companies cannot 
justify tens of millions of dollars of investment for a 4-day convention, it is clear that these were 
planned investments that were simply timed to coincide with the start of the convention rather 
than as a direct result of the convention itself.1 Second, both the crowds and congestion as well 
as the intense security presence associated with political conventions can crowd out normal 
activity in the region since hotels, restaurants, and other businesses are not normally empty.2 For 
example, during the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City, attendance at 
Broadway shows fell over 20% compared to the same week a year earlier (Ehley 2012).  
Finally, mega-events may be subject to large leakages, which occur when spending takes 
place in a given area but the money does not stay in the local economy. The increased leakages 
can occur for two reasons. First, higher visitor spending at national chains including restaurants, 
stores, and hotels may result in increased corporate profits that are simply repatriated to 
corporate headquarters and stockholders outside of the metropolitan area in which the sales take 
place. As noted by Matheson (2009), there is substantial reason to believe that mega-events 
result in windfalls to capital rather than labor and therefore result in higher than normal leakages.  
Second, an event may attract temporary workers from outside the metropolitan area who 
make money during an event but leave town with their earnings once the event is over. Non-local 
temporary workers might bring needed skills and expertise, but their earnings likely have 
                                                          
1 Another possibility is that some potential infrastructure upgrades would not be worth their cost without hosting a 
mega event such as a convention, but that the event puts the total benefit of the upgrades “over the top” to make 
them worthwhile. 
2 Heberlig et al. (2015) examine the effect of increased security since the 9-11 attacks on cities’ willingness to host 
political conventions.  Coates and Humphreys (2003) find that the presence of professional sports teams does 
increase employment and earnings in the amusements and hospitality sector but that there are offsetting decreases in 
other sectors. 
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different multiplier effects from earnings by local workers. For example, it is common for host 
cities to bring in police officers from other cities and states to assist in providing security for 
national political conventions. In fact, roughly half of all security expenditures for these events is 
typically spent on non-local personnel. Not only do wages earned by temporary workers not 
recirculate in the local economy after the event is over, it is questionable whether this spending 
should even count as economic impact for the local host in the first place. If conventions do 
result in larger than normal leakages from host cities’ economies, the use of standard multipliers 
during mega-events is highly questionable.3 
Studies debunking the exaggerated claims of event promoters are common in the 
economics and regional science literature. Although articles such as Propheter (2012) and 
Rosentraub et al. (1994) focus on large sporting events, national political conventions are similar 
in terms of both the number of attendees and the media attention that large sporting events 
receive. As summarized by Coates and Humphreys (2008), these studies of sporting events 
routinely find actual economic impacts that are a small fraction of those claimed by event 
boosters. Most closely related to this paper, Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2009) analyze 
annual data from 1970-2005 for the 50 largest metropolitan areas in U.S., including all cities that 
hosted a national political convention during that time period. They find that the presence of the 
Republican or the Democratic National Convention has no discernable impact on employment, 
personal income, or personal income per capita in the cities where the events were held. The 
primary criticism of that paper’s methodology is the use of yearly data to identify an event that is 
less than one week in duration. To that end, this paper uses daily data to study hotel occupancy, 
                                                          
3 To give some sense of multipliers used in traditional economic impact studies, Connaughton (2012) uses 
multipliers ranging from 1.6 to 2.3 in an economic impact study of Charlotte, and Humphreys (1994) uses a 
multiplier of 2.148 in a study of the economic impact of a Super Bowl played in Atlanta.  By contrast, Siegfried and 
Zimbalist (2000) argue that 1.25 is a reasonable multiplier for sporting events, though it is unclear how applicable 
that multiplier would be for political conventions. 
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price, and revenue, an important part of the economic impact of national political conventions. 
Using daily data should make it more likely that the impact of short duration events can be 
detected and allows for the estimation of any effects in the days leading up to or immediately 
following events. Heretofore, the use of daily data is relatively rare in the economic impact 
literature although Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi (2009) use daily airline passenger arrivals to 
examine the economic impact of several sports events held in Hawaii and Mills and Rosentraub 
(2014) use daily bridge crossing data to estimate the number of Canadian fans visiting Buffalo, 
New York to attend professional hockey games. Analyses of the effect of sports and political 
events on hotel occupancy and revenue are also uncommon, with the notable exception of Lavoie 
and Rodriguez’s (2005) use of monthly hotel occupancy data to analyze the effect of various 
sports franchises on major Canadian cities.  Lavoie and Rodriguez (2005) use a Box-Jenkins 
approach to control for monthly seasonality in cities’ hotel occupancy rates and then regress the 
hotel occupancy rates on dummies for various events such as an NHL lockout and baseball 
strike.  They include no other control variables such as the unemployment rate to control for 
macroeconomic conditions, and they provide no separate analysis of hotel prices and revenue. 
 
Data and Empirical Framework  
 The Democratic Party held its 2008 convention in Denver from August 25-28 and its 
2012 convention in Charlotte from September 4-6.  The Republican Party held its 2008 
convention in St. Paul from September 1-4 and its 2012 convention in Tampa from August 27-
30. We analyze daily hotel data from the four host cities to assess an important component of the 
economic impact of hosting a national political convention.  For the 2008 host cities, we use 
daily hotel data covering 2007-2009, and we use daily hotel data from 2011-2013 for the 2012 
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host cities.  Because both the 2007-2009 and 2011-2013 periods contain leap years, there are 
1,096 observations in all regression models.  The hotel data cover the host cities’ entire 
metropolitan areas, not just their central business districts; hence the analysis should capture 
convention-goers who might choose to stay some distance from the convention venue and any 
travelers who might have normally stayed in the central business district but were crowded out 
by the political conventions.4 
For each city, we estimate models with three different dependent variables: the number of 
hotel rooms let, the average daily rate of the hotel rooms rented, and the hotels’ total revenue. 
Estimating models with three different dependent variables provides different insights into the 
economic impact of political conventions.  Estimates of the number of additional rooms occupied 
give the conventions’ marginal impact in terms of overnight guests.  Estimates of price effects 
associated with conventions speak to the point about leakages discussed earlier; large room price 
increases suggest greater leakages and smaller multiplier effects because the increased prices 
could flow to business owners or shareholders outside of the host city’s metropolitan area.  Since 
lodging expenses generally comprise the single largest portion of convention-goers’ spending in 
host cities, and since expenditures by convention visitors make up the majority of the economic 
impact in most economic impact studies of conventions, estimating the marginal change in hotel 
revenues is a large step toward determining the total economic impact derived from hosting a 
national political convention.5 The hotel occupancy, price, and revenue data are obtained from 
                                                          
4 Our results may be understated if any convention goers or other would be visitors to the host cities choose hotels 
outside of the metropolitan areas.  Host city occupancy rates do not exceed 95% in any city during the conventions 
so the need for visitors to seek lodging outside host cities metro areas should be small, but preferences for hotels in 
particular segments (e.g., budget vs. luxury) or in specific directions relative to the host cities central business 
districts might have made some visitors choose hotels outside of the metro areas over the rooms remaining available 
within a host city. 
5 We acknowledge, of course, that hotel revenues do not include spending on items such as restaurants or 
entertainment, but they do constitute a large component of within-city spending by a typical convention attendee. 
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Smith Travel Research, Inc., a vendor of hotel industry data for the U.S. and many other 
countries.  Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are reported in Table 2. 
 The estimated models can be represented as: 
, , , 
where DEPi,t  represents the three dependent variables (number of rooms, average room rate, or 
hotel revenue) used in the different estimations for city i at time t and β, γ, and π are vectors of 
coefficients to be estimated. The primary variables of interest in each regression are in the 
CONVENTION matrix, which contains a dummy variable taking a value of one for convention 
days and zero for other days and dummy variables (DAY1BEFORE, …, DAY7BEFORE, 
DAY1AFTER, …, DAY7AFTER) for the seven days leading up to a convention and the seven 
days following a convention. (For example, DAY1BEFORE is defined to have a value of one on 
the day before a political convention and 0 on other days.) These dummy variables make it 
possible to assess any changes in hotel occupancy leading up to political conventions or in the 
aftermath of political conventions. For example, some party leaders, security officials, or media 
members’ duties might require them to arrive in advance of a convention.  Likewise, some 
convention-goers might arrive a few days early or stay a few days late to explore host cities’ 
attractions. Alternatively, the congestion and security concerns accompanying conventions might 
cause some travelers who might have come to a city in the week before or the week after a 
convention to cancel their trips or alter their timing.  Any such effects would be detectable using 
the day before and day after variables. 
The models also contain a matrix of variables, MACRO, to control for city-specific and 
national economic conditions.  This matrix includes a city-specific time trend, and time-varying 
measures of the host city’s unemployment rate, the host city’s population, and the national 
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unemployment rate to control for overall macroeconomic conditions.6  It might be especially 
important to control for macroeconomic conditions in the Denver and St. Paul regressions 
because the 2007-2009 period includes a severe recession. 
 Lastly, to control for routine hotel occupancy patterns in each city, the matrix 
FIXEDEFFECTS includes year, month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects, and a dummy 
variable for six major holidays (New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, July Fourth, Labor Day, 
Thanksgiving, and Christmas).  Since the regression models for each city are estimated 
separately, our estimation strategy allows any seasonal patterns to vary across cities.  One might, 




 The results of estimating the room, price, and revenue models for each city are reported 
in Tables 3-6.  The parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates contain Newey-West standard 
errors to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  For brevity, the time trends and the 
day of week, month of year, and holiday fixed effects are omitted from the tables.  None of the 
time trends are large or statistically different from zero.  In all cities, holidays are associated with 
a large (5,000 to 10,000) reduction in rooms let.  In three cities (all but Tampa), hotel rentals are 
“hump-shaped” over the course of the year, with fewer rentals in winter months than in summer 
or early fall months.  In Tampa, by contrast, February and March are peak season for hotel room 
                                                          
6 Because political conventions draw visitors from across the country, the national unemployment rate may be a 
more appropriate measure of macroeconomic conditions than the host city’s unemployment rate would be. However, 
some cities may have economies that behave differently from the national economy so the local unemployment rate 
might contain additional information about demand for travel to a city.  For the cities in this study, however, the 
host-city unemployment rates are highly correlated with the national unemployment rate (at least 0.8 in all cases and 
over 0.9 for most cases) and the estimated effects for the convention variables are similar if we estimate the model 
with only the national unemployment rate or only the host-city unemployment rate. 
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rentals.  The day of week room rental patterns are similar for Charlotte, Denver, and St. Paul—a 
large reduction in rooms rented on Sunday nights with the maximum room rentals occurring on 
Tuesday and Wednesday nights.  For Tampa, Sundays are also the lowest night for room rentals 
but Fridays and Saturdays have the highest number of rentals.    
 The coefficient estimates indicate that the number of additional rooms let ranges from 
about 5,000 (Denver) to 10,500 (Tampa) for each day of a convention.  The average room rate 
roughly doubles during conventions, with increases ranging from $90 (St. Paul) to $115 
(Charlotte). This result is consistent with concerns explained earlier about conventions having 
larger leakages than non-convention economic activity in the host cities.  Nightly hotel revenue 
increases by a range of $3.72 million (St. Paul) to $4.44 million (Tampa); however, Charlotte has 
the largest percentage gain at 132%. 
 Turning to the dummy variables for the days before and after conventions, all four cities 
have large increases in rooms let on the day before the conventions. This is likely due to 
convention-goers arriving a day early. Moreover, the estimated coefficients for the days before 
conventions are considerably larger than the coefficients for the convention dummy variables 
themselves. This is likely an artifact of hotels traditionally having lower occupancy on Sundays 
(the day before the convention in three of the cities) and Labor Day (the day before the 
convention in the other city) than on Mondays. Hence, the marginal effect of conventions is 
larger on days before conventions than on the actual convention dates. Three of the four cities 
(all but Denver) also show large increases in hotel rooms rented two days before their 
conventions.  Beyond the two days immediately before a convention, however, there is scant 
evidence that conventions attract additional visitors on the days before or after conventions.  
Indeed, all cities have statistically significant decreases in the number of rooms let on several of 
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the days following a convention.  Likewise, three cities (all but Tampa) show reduced hotel room 
rentals for days three to seven before conventions. Without using daily data, traditional economic 
impact studies do not have the precision available to incorporate the “hangover” of reduced hotel 
demand in the days following conventions or the reduction in visitors during days three to seven 
before conventions.  The statistically and substantively significant coefficients on the “Day 
After” variables indicate that this “hangover” effect is substantial, providing evidence in favor of 
the daily approach of this paper as opposed to previous methodologies unable to capture such an 
effect. 
 As for price and hotel revenue effects, all cities see statistically significant increases in 
the average room rate for all seven days leading up to conventions. Hotel revenues also increase 
in all cities for the three nights before conventions, with three cities (all but St. Paul) showing 
increases for additional nights before their conventions. The days following conventions show no 
clear patterns of room rate or hotel revenue changes, but all cities have at least one day or 
significantly decreased hotel revenue following hosting a convention.  
 Table 7 summarizes the cumulative effects of rooms rented and hotel revenues over 
various periods around conventions. Since there is no “right answer” as to how many days 
around conventions should be included in estimating their economic impact, we include 
calculations based on convention days only and on 1, 3, 5, and 7 day windows around 
conventions. Inspection of Table 7 reveals that the number of hotel rooms rented is much more 
sensitive than hotel revenues to the window chosen. For three cities (all but Tampa), the 
cumulative number of rooms let during convention days is considerably larger than the 
cumulative number rented during the seven-day window before and after the convention. By 
contrast, the cumulative revenue estimates are less sensitive to the window chosen, with revenue 
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during convention days being about 60% of the revenue during the seven day before and after 
window.  
 Table 7 also allows for a quick comparison of any differences in economic impact 
between the political parties even though there are only two conventions per party in the 
analysis.  Looking at only the number of rooms rented during the conventions, the average 
number of rooms let during the Democratic conventions in Charlotte and Denver (about 20,400) 
is considerably less than the average number of rooms rented during the Republican conventions 
in St. Paul and Tampa (about 37,000). (Keep in mind that the Charlotte convention lasted only 
three nights; however, different convention lengths cannot explain the difference between 
Democrats and Republicans.)  It is somewhat surprising that the number of rooms rented during 
Democratic conventions is fewer than the number rented during Republican conventions because 
Democratic conventions have substantially larger numbers of delegates than Republican 
conventions.7 On the other hand, the average revenue effects associated with the two Republican 
conventions (about $16.3 million) are not that much larger than the average revenue gains for the 
two Democratic conventions (about $14.3 million) and are likely primarily attributable to the 
Democrats’ Charlotte convention lasting only three days. 
 
Robustness Checks 
City-by-City Placebo Tests 
 Our first robustness check is a placebo test using cities that vied to host conventions but 
were not selected. If our results are an artifact of the particular city characteristics that cause a 
                                                          
7 The 2008 and 2012 Democratic conventions had 4,419 and 5,556 delegates, respectively.  The 2008 and 2012 
Republican conventions had 2,380 and 2,286 delegates, respectively. The lack of a clear link between the number of 
delegates and the number of hotel rooms rented during conventions also speaks to the difficulty of estimating the 
economic impact of conventions. There are, of course, other attendees at conventions such as media and spouses or 
companions of delegates but the former should be largely invariant to the number of delegates (or the political party) 
and the latter should be roughly proportionate to the number of delegates regardless of party. 
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city to be considered for a political convention rather than the political conventions themselves, 
then we would expect to see a pattern of positive and significant coefficients on the 
“Convention” and “Day Before” variables in estimates using these unselected cities.  If, on the 
other hand, the result of our primary specifications hold, then we should see either statistically 
insignificant or negative coefficients for these variables in estimated of the cities not selected. 
We perform this test for three of the four host cities.  Denver is not suitable for a placebo 
test because Minneapolis, which hosted the 2008 Republican convention less than a week after 
the Democrats were in Denver, was a finalist to host the DNC.  The placebo cities for the 2008 
Republican convention in St. Paul are Cleveland and Tampa.  The placebo cities for the 2012 
Democratic convention are Cleveland, St. Louis, and St. Paul.  The placebo cities for the 2012 
Republican convention are Phoenix and Salt Lake City. 
 The placebo estimation results are reported in Table 8.  For brevity we report only the 
estimated coefficient on the convention days dummy variable; complete results are available 
upon request, and are all consistent with what we would expect to find in a placebo test 
confirming our results.  In all cases there is no evidence that the results in Tables 3-6 are 
spurious because there are no positive room, average room rate, or revenue effects.  The negative 
placebo effects are likely attributable to conventions typically occurring just before or just after 
Labor Day, a time of reduced leisure travel as summer vacations wind down and reduced 
business travel around the holiday. 
 
Pooled Data 
 As a second robustness check, we perform another placebo test using pooled data for all 
four host cities for the years 2007-2013. If the results are an artifact of the particular days chosen 
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to host a convention, rather than a measure of the impact of the conventions themselves, then we 
would expect to see similar results in the placebo tests in the non-hosting convention cities 
during this time period as well.  Using the merged data, we estimate a model similar to the city-
specific models discussed above. Using the same three dependent variables (the number of 
rooms, the average daily room rate, and daily hotel revenue), the variable of interest is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one for city-day combinations on which a national political convention 
is being held.  The covariates are the same as those included in the previous regressions except 
(1) the days before or after dummy variables are omitted, and (2) city fixed effects are now 
included.  The model is estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by city to control for 
serial correlation.  The pooled results are reported in the top panel of Table 9 and are consistent 
with the city-by-city results.  Conventions are estimated to increase the number of hotel rooms 
let by about 8,325 per night, increase prices by almost $100 per night, and to increase hotel 
revenue by approximately $4.16 million. (Coefficient estimates for variables other than the 
conventions dummy variable are omitted for brevity but are available upon request.)   
 For the placebo test, we use an identical framework except that the dummy variable 
taking a value of one on city-date pairs on which a convention is being held is replaced by a 
placebo convention dummy variable. The placebo convention dummy variable takes a value of 
one on city-date combinations on which a convention is being held in a different city. For 
example, the 2012 Democratic National Convention was held in Charlotte from September 4-6, 
2012. The placebo convention dummy variable is defined to take a value of one on these dates 
for the cities of Denver, St. Paul, and Tampa. If the model is accurately reflecting the economic 
impacts of a political convention, then there should not be a positive impact of the “placebo” 
convention variable in cities where the convention is not being held.  The placebo estimation 
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results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 9 (with all coefficient estimates other than the 
placebo convention dummy omitted for brevity). The placebo test results are consistent with our 
previous findings.  The estimated coefficient on the placebo dummy is negative in the number of 
rooms, average daily room rates, and hotel revenue models.  (As with the city-by-city placebo 
results, we attribute the negative coefficients to conventions occurring just before or after Labor 
Day, a time of reduced travel.)  Hence, we are confident that our findings of positive convention 
effects are not artifacts of conventions being held on days that would otherwise experience 
strong demand for hotel room rentals. 
 
Conclusion  
Cities and states often tout mega events as vehicles for economic growth. This paper 
finds, as simple observation would suggest, that hosting national political conventions generates 
a large inflow of overnight visitors and increases hotel revenue. However, the cumulative effect 
of approximately 29,000 additional room nights of lodging services and $20 million of hotel 
revenue imply that traditional economic impact estimates may be unrealistically large. Economic 
impacts exceeding $150 million, as are often claimed, require large assumptions about the 
amount of convention-goers’ spending on food, beverages, or other goods and services or big 
multiplier effects. Without a substantial multiplier effect, average convention-goers would need 
to spend at least seven times the amount that they spend on hotel rooms in the destination city 
(not including airfare), in order for even the smallest estimates of traditional economic impact to 
be accurate, or massive sums would need to be spent at local business or on local labor by 
convention organizers in staging the event.  Even if multipliers were as large as 1.5, average 
convention-goers would need to spend at least four times the amount of hotel spending on other 
 14
expenses (food, local transportation, etc.) in the destination city.  Given that lodging expenses 
tend to constitute the largest share of a convention-goer’s spending, this assumption seems 
unrealistic.  Moreover, it is also important to note that even the modest benefits found in our 
results could easily be swamped by the additional costs associated with hosting major political 
conventions.  For all of these reasons, after carefully assessing one of the most crucial 
components of convention spending at a daily level, political conventions do not seem to have 





Baade RA, Dye RF (1988) An analysis of the economic rationale for public subsidization of 
sports stadiums. The Annals of Regional Science 22: 37-47. 
 
Baade RA, Baumann R, Matheson VA (2009) Rejecting “conventional” wisdom: Estimating the 
economic impact of national political conventions. Eastern Economic Journal 35: 520-
530. 
 
Baumann R, Matheson V, Muroi C (2009) Bowling in Hawaii: Examining the effectiveness of 
sports-based tourism strategies. Journal of Sports Economics 10: 107-123. 
 
Beacon Hill Institute (2004) The economic impact of the Democratic National Convention on the 
Boston economy: The final tally, Suffolk University, 
http://www.beaconhill.org/BHIFaxSheetDNCFinal08094.pdf, posted August 9, 2004. 
 
City and County of Denver and 2008 Convention Host Committee (2008) 2008 Democratic 
National Convention Impact Report, 
www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/chrnconv08/denverimpact.pdf 
 
Coates D, Humphreys BR (2003) The effect of professional sports on earnings and employment 
in the services and retail sectors in US cities. Regional Science and Urban Economics 33: 
175-198 
 
Coates D, Humphreys BR (2008) Do economists reach a conclusion on subsidies for sports 
franchises, stadiums, and mega-events? Econ Journal Watch 5: 294-315. 
 
Connaughton JE (2012) The economic impact of sports and sports events on the Charlotte MSA 
economy.  Available at http://northcarolinamotorsportsassociation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/CharlotteMSASportsEcon.pdf 
 
Danielson R (2013) Study: Republican National Convention put $214M directly into Tampa Bay 
economy. Tampa Bay Times (August 12). 
 




Farkas K (2016) Republican National Convention to transform and disrupt Cleveland: By the 
numbers, 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/12/republican_national_convention.html
, posted December 2, 2014. 
 
Heberlig ES, Leland SM, Shields M, Swindell D (2015) The disruption costs of post-9-11 
security measures and cities’ bids for presidential nominating conventions. Journal of 
Urban Affairs 38: 370-386. 
 
 16
Humphreys J (1994). The Economic impact of hosting Super Bowl XXVIII on Georgia. Georgia 
Business and Economic Conditions, May-June, 18-21. 
 
Kench B (2012) The 2012 Republican National Convention’s Economic Impact on Tampa Bay. 
University of Tampa. http://www.tampagov.net/sites/default/files/public-
affairs/files/20130820_RNCEconomicImpactReport_Kench.pdf 
 
Lavoie M, Rodriguez G (2005) The economic impact of professional teams on monthly hotel 
occupancy rates of Canadian cities:  A Box-Jenkins approach. Journal of Sports 
Economics 6: 314-324. 
 
Matheson V (2008) Mega-events: The effect of the world’s biggest sporting events on local, 
regional, and national economies, in The Business of Sports, Vol. 1,” Dennis Howard and 
Brad Humphreys, eds., (Westport, CT:  Praeger Publishers), 81-99. 
 
Matheson V (2009) Economic multipliers and mega-event analysis. International Journal of 
Sport Finance 4: 63-70. 
 
Mills BM, Rosentraub MS (2014) The National Hockey League and cross-border fandom: Fan 
substitution and international boundaries. Journal of Sports Economics 15: 497-518. 
 
Minneapolis Saint Paul 2008 Host Committee. (2009) 2008 Republican National Convention 
impact report, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2009/09/01_rncimpact/report.pdf 
 
New York City Mayor’s Office. (2004) Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg delivers 2004 Republican 
National Convention wrap-up and assesses $255 million impact on city's economy. 
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/236-04/mayor-michael-bloomberg-
delivers-2004-republican-national-convention-wrap-up-assesses-255, posted September 
4, 2004. 
 
Propheter G (2012) Are basketball arenas catalysts of economic development? Journal of Urban 
Affairs 34: 441-459. 
 
Rosentraub MS, Swindell D, Przybylski M, Mullins DR (1994) Sport and downtown 
development strategy: If you build it, will jobs come? Journal of Urban Affairs 16: 221-
239. 
 
Siegfried J, Zimbalist A (2000) The economics of sports facilities and their communities. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 95-114. 
 
Spanberg E (2013) Study: Charlotte DNC worth $164M. 
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/queen_city_agenda/2013/01/study-finds-dnc-
impact-more-than-163.html, posted January 23, 2013. 
 
 17
Van Oot T (2016) DNC a boon to Philly's stature; Money impact likely mixed, 
http://www.necn.com/news/national-international/DNC-Economic-Impact-Convention-
Philadelphia-Hotels-Jobs-Money-2016-Democrats-Cost--291741811.html, posted 




Table 1:  Reported Economic Impact of Political Conventions 
 
Year Party Location Impact  
($ mil.) 
Source 
2004 Rep. New York City $255 New York City Mayor’s Office (2004)
2004 Dem. Boston, MA $156.7 Beacon Hill Institute (2004) 
2008 Rep. St. Paul, MN $168.2 Minneapolis Saint Paul 2008 Host Committee 
(2009) 
2008 Dem. Denver, CO $266.1 2008 Democratic National Convention Impact 
Report City and County of Denver and Denver 
2008 Convention Host Committee (2008) 
2012 Rep. Tampa Bay, FL $404.4 Kench (2012)  
2012 Dem. Charlotte, NC $163.6 Spanberg (2013)  
2016 Rep. Cleveland, OH $400 (est.) Farkas, Karen (2014) 
2016 Dem. Philadelphia, PA $170-350 
(est.) 































 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Charlotte 2011-2013     
Rooms 20,369 4,362 8,626 31,015 
Price $85.22 $13.45 $60.31 $212.00 
Revenue $1.77 $0.61 $0.52 $6.38 
     
Denver 2007-2009     
Rooms 23,677 5,543 9,834 36,478 
Price $97.28 $15.62 $62.13 $215.01 
Revenue $2.36 $0.84 $0.67 $7.50 
     
St. Paul 2007-2009     
Rooms 22,350 5,577 6,865 34,206 
Price $95.21 $12.31 $65.56 $196.52 
Revenue $2.17 $0.74 $0.50 $6.65 
     
Tampa 2011-2013     
Rooms 27,768 5,363 14,074 43,046 
Price $96.32 $12.53 $72.23 $189.00 
Revenue $2.72 $0.85 $1.02 $6.98 




Charlotte Regression Results 
Variable Number of Rooms Average Room Price Total Revenue 
Day7Before -1,679*** 12.30*** 108,056** 
 (439) (1.15) (53,053) 
Day6Before -2,144*** 14.11*** 99,703* 
 (451) (1.17) (54,543) 
Day5Before -4,143*** 19.83*** -11,764 
 (445) (1.11) (51,743) 
Day4Before -3,554*** 49.09*** 591,516*** 
 (474) (1.09) (52,453) 
Day3Before -1,602** 64.18*** 1,259,050*** 
 (638) (1.61) (86,007) 
Day2Before 7,993*** 103.65*** 3,131,551*** 
 (586) (1.43) (76,858) 
Day1Before 13,591*** 135.59*** 4,754,954*** 
 (986) (2.04) (118,847) 
Convention 6,804*** 114.75*** 4,111,985*** 
(3 days) (620) (1.54) (78,805) 
Day1After -9,273*** 26.50*** -427,714*** 
 (566) (1.41) (75,771) 
Day2After -10,500*** -5.80*** -963,275*** 
 (581) (1.42) (77,504) 
Day3After -4,216*** 0.93 -361,508*** 
 (538) (1.29) (70,708) 
Day4After -1,091** 3.47*** -28,021 
 (537) (1.30) (70,847) 
Day5After -209 1.73 32,530 
 (551) (1.29) (72,777) 
Day6After 479 1.69 97,034 
 (541) (1.26) (71,234) 
Day7After -417 2.28* 10,596 
 (537) (1.25) (70,361) 
Charlotte Unemp 559 3.39 103,144 
 (1,170) (3.09) (161,339) 
U.S. Unemp -1,193 -3.68 -175,792 
 (2,266) (5.81) (306,699) 
Charlotte Pop 146 0.83 27,959 
 (280) (0.74) (35,805) 
Constant -304,749 -1,785.13 -60,988,850 
 (635,782) (1,671.45) (81,298,824) 
Parentheses contain standard errors; *,**, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, 
respectively.  Models also include year, month, and day of week fixed effects, a dummy variable 




Denver Regression Results 
Variable Number of Rooms Average Room Price Total Revenue 
Day7Before -2,245*** 8.92*** 8,704 
 (715) (1.51) (99,529) 
Day6Before -1,162 10.51*** 210,551** 
 (726) (1.55) (101,776) 
Day5Before -538 14.11*** 403,242*** 
 (732) (1.56) (102,504) 
Day4Before -1,440** 21.93*** 479,011*** 
 (726) (1.50) (99,972) 
Day3Before -2,543*** 34.81*** 592,437*** 
 (745) (1.52) (100,634) 
Day2Before -414 62.85*** 1,599,794*** 
 (752) (1.53) (101,125) 
Day1Before 7,453*** 103.70*** 3,840,623*** 
 (745) (1.59) (100,967) 
Convention 5,092*** 102.29*** 4,111,910*** 
(4 days) (775) (1.82) (114,053) 
Day1After -5,071*** 24.48*** 34,833 
 (809) (1.64) (108,336) 
Day2After -5,385*** -0.27 -551,594*** 
 (820) (1.67) (109,499) 
Day3After -4,086*** -7.35*** -588,908*** 
 (816) (1.74) (109,792) 
Day4After -5,215*** -2.16 -673,262*** 
 (1,253) (3.21) (181,014) 
Day5After -6,475*** 2.34 -638,716*** 
 (742) (2.09) (117,447) 
Day6After 264 13.81*** 522,192*** 
 (732) (2.09) (116,447) 
Day7After 2,650*** 17.05*** 875,445*** 
 (730) (2.12) (115,795) 
Denver Unemp -994 -5.53 -250,341 
 (2,620) (6.37) (361,341) 
U.S. Unemp -106 -0.83 -27,540 
 (1,956) (4.96) (272,485) 
Denver Pop -143** 0.12 -14,864 
 (71) (0.18) (9,545) 
Constant 370,790** -192.60 38,821,196* 
 (172,882) (434.99) (23,331,368) 
Parentheses contain standard errors; *,**, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, 
respectively.  Models also include year, month, and day of week fixed effects, a dummy variable 





St. Paul Regression Results 
Variable Number of Rooms Average Room Price Total Revenue 
Day7Before -2,033*** 3.60*** -101,311 
 (576) (1.04) (76,003) 
Day6Before -2,364*** 4.58*** -96,007 
 (605) (1.09) (79,723) 
Day5Before -4,108*** 7.14*** -226,509*** 
 (620) (1.12) (81,214) 
Day4Before -5,373*** 13.44*** -247,615*** 
 (598) (1.04) (78,148) 
Day3Before -2,287*** 34.71*** 615,353*** 
 (617) (1.09) (80,436) 
Day2Before 3,356*** 53.17*** 1,996,498*** 
 (612) (1.08) (79,911) 
Day1Before 12,130*** 89.27*** 4,010,311*** 
 (616) (1.08) (79,330) 
Convention 8,023*** 89.76*** 3,723,488*** 
(4 days) (1,189) (3.08) (154,604) 
Day1After -5,111*** 16.88*** -138,596* 
 (577) (1.46) (83,996) 
Day2After -4,912*** 2.63* -395,745*** 
 (578) (1.45) (84,099) 
Day3After -2,704*** 6.20*** -199,790** 
 (567) (1.51) (83,832) 
Day4After -860 3.64** 27,955 
 (588) (1.44) (86,323) 
Day5After -29 4.50*** 163,322* 
 (620) (1.45) (90,403) 
Day6After 429 2.35 151,930* 
 (606) (1.43) (88,564) 
Day7After -511 1.93 12,449 
 (576) (1.41) (83,919) 
MSP Unemp -1,266 -0.22 -72,825 
 (1,899) (3.72) (241,210) 
U.S. Unemp 94 -3.64* -115,775 
 (1,122) (2.09) (142,301) 
MSP Pop 26 -0.12 3,929 
 (112) (0.22) (13,827) 
Constant -60,542 487.26 -10,176,776 
 (360,913) (704.15) (44,496,059) 
Parentheses contain standard errors; *,**, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, 
respectively.  Models also include year, month, and day of week fixed effects, a dummy variable 





Tampa Regression Results 
Variable Number of Rooms Average Room Price Total Revenue 
Day7Before 1,369** 5.78*** 286,321*** 
 (634) (1.06) (83,810) 
Day6Before 1,418** 6.61*** 304,408*** 
 (633) (1.05) (83,200) 
Day5Before 747 9.03*** 303,459*** 
 (627) (1.04) (82,559) 
Day4Before 863 16.93*** 529,952*** 
 (626) (1.03) (82,334) 
Day3Before 449 37.38*** 1,067,100*** 
 (619) (1.04) (81,329) 
Day2Before 2,137*** 61.52*** 2,088,051*** 
 (641) (1.07) (83,981) 
Day1Before 14,645*** 102.17*** 4,907,043*** 
 (681) (1.14) (89,641) 
Convention 10,464*** 96.54*** 4,443,218*** 
(4 days) (740) (1.25) (104,528) 
Day1After -5,558*** 30.15*** 155,887* 
 (686) (1.18) (91,640) 
Day2After -904 8.55*** 136,979 
 (649) (1.17) (86,160) 
Day3After 4,302*** 10.56*** 685,238*** 
 (611) (1.13) (82,505) 
Day4After -2,563** -1.93 -171,803 
 (1,054) (2.02) (129,927) 
Day5After -3,788*** -2.12* -380,238*** 
 (600) (1.10) (79,114) 
Day6After -1,638*** 0.26 -148,880* 
 (590) (1.09) (78,051) 
Day7After -1,756*** 1.32 -112,842 
 (579) (1.09) (77,556) 
Tampa Unemp -779 -6.08* -383,478 
 (2,053) (3.66) (270,849) 
U.S. Unemp 640 4.53 301,762 
 (1,986) (3.20) (259,005) 
Tampa Pop 92 0.19 15,181 
 (98) (0.18) (13,159) 
Constant -228,612 -414.39 -38,870,371 
 (271,945) (483.29) (36,297,413) 
Parentheses contain standard errors; *,**, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, 
respectively.  Models also include year, month, and day of week fixed effects, a dummy variable 





 Window Around Convention 
 Convention +/- 1Day +/- 3 Days +/- 5 Days +/- 7 Days 
Charlotte      
Rooms 20,412 24,730 16,405 7,408 3,647 
Revenue $12.34 $16.66 $19.73 $20.31 $20.63 
      
Denver      
Rooms 20,368 22,750 10,322 -3,346 -3,839 
Revenue $16.45 $20.32 $21.67 $21.25 $22.86 
      
St. Paul      
Rooms 31,092 43,711 37,164 26,794 22,315 
Revenue $14.89 $18.77 $20.78 $20.50 $20.47 
      
Tampa      
Rooms 41,856 50,943 56,927 52,186 51,579 
Revenue $17.77 $22.84 $26.81 $27.09 $27.42 
      
Average      
Rooms 28,682 35,534 30,205 20,761 18,426 
Revenue $15.36 $19.65 $22.25 $22.29 $22.85 









City-by-City Placebo Regression Results 
2008 Republican Convention—St. Paul 














2012 Democratic Convention—Charlotte 




















2012 Republican Convention—Tampa 













*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Newey-West 
standard errors are in parentheses.  Models also include year, month, and day of week fixed 










Pooled Placebo Regression Results 
Pooled Data 









 Number of Rooms Average Room Price Total Revenue 






*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Standard errors 
clustered by city are in parentheses.  Models also include year, month, day of week, and city 
fixed effects, a dummy variable for major holidays, a city-specific population control and city-
specific time trends, and both the national and city-specific unemployment rates. 
 
 
